Google serves some 80 percent of all search queries on the Internet, making it by far the most popular search engine. Its popularity is due not only to excellent search effectiveness, but also extensive querying capabilities.
Dangerous Google ? Searching for Secrets Micha? Piotrowski This article has been published in issue 4/2005 of the hakin9 magazine. All rights reserved. This file may be distributed for free pending no changes are made to its contents or form. hakin9 magazine, Wydawnictwo Software, ul. Lewartowskiego 6, 00-190 Warszawa, firstname.lastname@example.org www.hakin9.org 2 hakin9 4/2005 Basics G oogle serves some 80 percent of all search queries on the Internet, mak- ing it by far the most popular search engine. Its popularity is due not only to excel- lent search effectiveness, but also extensive querying capabilities. However, we should also remember that the Internet is a highly dynamic medium, so the results presented by Google are not always up-to-date ? some search results might be stale, while other relevant resources might not yet have been visited by Googlebot (the automatic script that browses and indexes Web resources for Google). Table 1 presents a summary of the most important and most useful query operators along with their descriptions, while Figure 1 shows document locations referred to by the operators when applied to Web searches. Of course, this is just a handful of examples ? skil- ful Google querying can lead to much more interesting results. Hunting for Prey Google makes it possible to reach not just publicly available Internet resources, but also some that should never have been revealed. Dangerous Google ? Searching for Secrets Micha? Piotrowski Information which should be protected is very often publicly available, revealed by careless or ignorant users. The result is that lots of confidential data is freely available on the Internet ? just Google for it. About the Author Micha? Piotrowski holds an MA in IT and has many years' experience in network and system administration. For over three years he has been a security inspector and is currently work- ing as computer network security expert at one of the largest Polish financial institutions. His free time is occupied by programming, cryp- tography and contributing to the open source community. What You Will Learn... ? how to use Google to find sources of personal information and other confidential data, ? how to find information about vulnerable sys- tems and Web services, ? how to locate publicly available network de- vices using Google. What You Should Know... ? how to use a Web browser, ? basic rules of operation of the HTTP protocol. www.hakin9.org 3 hakin9 4/2005 Google hacking Table 1. Google query operators Operator Description Sample query site restricts results to sites within the specified domain site:google.com fox will find all sites containing the word fox, located within the *.google.com domain intitle restricts results to documents whose title contains the specified phrase intitle:fox fire will find all sites with the word fox in the title and fire in the text allintitle restricts results to documents whose title contains all the specified phrases allintitle:fox fire will find all sites with the words fox and fire in the title, so it's equivalent to intitle:fox intitle:fire inurl restricts results to sites whose URL contains the specified phrase inurl:fox fire will find all sites containing the word fire in the text and fox in the URL allinurl restricts results to sites whose URL contains all the specified phrases allinurl:fox fire will find all sites with the words fox and fire in the URL, so it's equivalent to inurl:fox inurl:fire filetype, ext restricts results to documents of the specified type filetype:pdf fire will return PDFs containing the word fire, while filetype:xls fox will return Excel spreadsheets with the word fox numrange restricts results to documents con- taining a number from the specified range numrange:1-100 fire will return sites containing a number from 1 to 100 and the word fire. The same result can be achieved with 1..100 fire link restricts results to sites containing links to the specified location link:www.google.com will return documents containing one or more links to www.google.com inanchor restricts results to sites containing links with the specified phrase in their descriptions inanchor:fire will return documents with links whose description contains the word fire (that's the actual link text, not the URL indicated by the link) allintext restricts results to documents con- taining the specified phrase in the text, but not in the title, link descrip- tions or URLs allintext:"fire fox" will return documents which con- tain the phrase fire fox in their text only + specifies that a phrase should occur frequently in results +fire will order results by the number of occurrences of the word fire - specifies that a phrase must not oc- cur in results -fire will return documents that don't contain the word fire "" delimiters for entire search phrases (not single words) "fire fox" will return documents containing the phrase fire fox . wildcard for a single character fire.fox will return documents containing the phrases fire fox, fireAfox, fire1fox, fire-fox etc. * wildcard for a single word fire * fox will return documents containing the phrases fire the fox, fire in fox, fire or fox etc. | logical OR "fire fox" | firefox will return documents containing the phrase fire fox or the word firefox www.hakin9.org 4 hakin9 4/2005 Basics The right query can yield some quite remarkable results. Let's start with something simple. Suppose that a vulnerability is discovered in a popular application ? let's say it's the Microsoft IIS server version 5.0 ? and a hypothetical at- tacker decides to find a few comput- ers running this software in order to attack them. He could of course use a scanner of some description, but he prefers Google, so he just enters the query "Microsoft-IIS/5.0 Server at" intitle:index.of and obtains links to the servers he needs (or, more specifically, links to autogen- erated directory listings for those servers). This works because in its standard configuration, IIS (just like many other server applications) adds banners containing its name and ver- sion to some dynamically generated pages (Figure 2 shows this query in action). It's a typical example of infor- mation which seems quite harm- less, so is frequently ignored and remains in the standard con- figuration. Unfortunately, it is also information which in certain circum- stances can be most valuable to a potential attacker. Table 2 shows more sample Google queries for typical Web servers. Another way of locating specific versions of Web servers is to search for the standard pages displayed after successful server installation. Strange though it may seem, there are plenty of Web servers out there, the default configuration of which hasn't been touched since installa- tion. They are frequently forgotten, ill-secured machines which are easy prey for attackers. They can be located using the queries shown in Table 3. This method is both very simple and extremely useful, as it provides access to a huge number of various websites and operating systems which run applications with known vulnerabilities that lazy or ignorant administrators have not patched. We will see how this works for two fairly popular programs: WebJeff Fileman- ager and Advanced Guestbook. The first is a web-based file manager for uploading, browsing, managing and modifying files on a server. Unfortunately, WebJeff Filemanager version 1.6 contains a bug which makes it possible to download any file on the server, as long as it's accessible to the user running the HTTP daemon. In other words, specifying a page such as /index.php3?action=telecharger&f ichier=/etc/passwd in a vulnerable system will let any intruder download the /etc/passwd file (see Figure 3). The aggressor will of course locate vulnerable installations by querying Google for "WebJeff-Filemanager 1.6" Login. Our other target ? Advanced Guestbook ? is a PHP application Figure 1. The use of search query operators illustrated using the hakin9 website Figure 2. Locating IIS 5.0 servers using the intitle operator www.hakin9.org 5 hakin9 4/2005 Google hacking with SQL database support, used for adding guestbooks to web- sites. In April 2004, information was published about a vulnerabil- ity in the application's 2.2 version, making it possible to access the administration panel using an SQL injection attack (see SQL Injection Attacks with PHP/MySQL in hakin9 3/2005). It's enough to navigate to the panel login screen (see Figure 4) and log in leaving the username blank and entering ') OR ('a' = 'a as password or the other way around ? leaving password blank and entering ? or 1=1 -- for username. The potential aggres- sor can locate vulnerable websites by querying Google for intitle: Guestbook "Advanced Guestbook 2.2 Powered" or "Advanced Guestbook 2.2" Username inurl:admin. To prevent such security leaks, administrators should track current information on all the applications used by their systems and imme- diately patch any vulnerabilities. Another thing to bear in mind is that it's well worth removing application banners, names and versions from any pages or files that might contain them. Information about Networks and Systems Practically all attacks on IT sys- tems require preparatory target reconnaissance, usually involving scanning computers in an attempt Table 2. Google queries for locating various Web servers Query Server "Apache/1.3.28 Server at" intitle:index.of Apache 1.3.28 "Apache/2.0 Server at" intitle:index.of Apache 2.0 "Apache/* Server at" intitle:index.of any version of Apache "Microsoft-IIS/4.0 Server at" intitle:index.of Microsoft Internet Information Services 4.0 "Microsoft-IIS/5.0 Server at" intitle:index.of Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.0 "Microsoft-IIS/6.0 Server at" intitle:index.of Microsoft Internet Information Services 6.0 "Microsoft-IIS/* Server at" intitle:index.of any version of Microsoft Internet Information Services "Oracle HTTP Server/* Server at" intitle:index.of any version of Oracle HTTP Server "IBM _ HTTP _ Server/* * Server at" intitle:index.of any version of IBM HTTP Server "Netscape/* Server at" intitle:index.of any version of Netscape Server "Red Hat Secure/*" intitle:index.of any version of the Red Hat Secure server "HP Apache-based Web Server/*" intitle:index.of any version of the HP server Table 3. Queries for discovering standard post-installation Web server pages Query Server intitle:"Test Page for Apache Installation" "You are free" Apache 1.2.6 intitle:"Test Page for Apache Installation" "It worked!" "this Web site!" Apache 1.3.0 ? 1.3.9 intitle:"Test Page for Apache Installation" "Seeing this instead" Apache 1.3.11 ? 1.3.33, 2.0 intitle:"Test Page for the SSL/TLS-aware Apache Installation" "Hey, it worked!" Apache SSL/TLS intitle:"Test Page for the Apache Web Server on Red Hat Linux" Apache on Red Hat intitle:"Test Page for the Apache Http Server on Fedora Core" Apache on Fedora intitle:"Welcome to Your New Home Page!" Debian Apache on Debian intitle:"Welcome to IIS 4.0!" IIS 4.0 intitle:"Welcome to Windows 2000 Internet Services" IIS 5.0 intitle:"Welcome to Windows XP Server Internet Services" IIS 6.0 www.hakin9.org 6 hakin9 4/2005 Basics to recognise running services, op- erating systems and specific service software. Network scanners such as Nmap or amap are typically used for this purpose, but another possibility also exists. Many system administra- tors install Web-based applications which generate system load statis- tics, show disk space usage or even display system logs. All this can be valuable informa- tion to an intruder. Simply querying Google for statistics generated and signed by the phpSystem applica- tion using the query "Generated by phpSystem" will result in a whole list of pages similar to the one shown in Figure 5. The intruder can also query for pages generated by the Sysinfo script using intitle:"Sysinfo * " intext:"Generated by Sysinfo * written by The Gamblers." ? these pages contain much more system information (Figure 6). This method offers numerous possibilities ? Table 4 shows sam- ple queries for finding statistics and other information generated by sev- eral popular applications. Obtaining such information may encourage the intruder to attack a given system and will help him find the right tools and exploits for the job. So if you decide to use Web applications to monitor computer resources, make sure ac- cess to them is password-protected. Looking for Errors HTTP error messages can be ex- tremely valuable to an attacker, as they can provide a wealth of infor- mation about the system, database structure and configuration. For example, finding errors generated by an Informix database merely re- quires querying for "A syntax error has occurred" filetype:ihtml. The re- sult will provide the intruder with er- ror messages containing information on database configuration, a sys- tem's file structure and sometimes even passwords (see Figure 7). The results can be narrowed down to only those containing passwords by altering the query slightly: "A syntax error has occurred" filetype:ihtml intext:LOGIN. Figure 3. A vulnerable version of WebJeff Filemanager Figure 4. Advanced Guestbook login page Figure 5. Statistics generated by phpSystem www.hakin9.org 7 hakin9 4/2005 Google hacking Equally useful information can be obtained from MySQL database errors simply by querying Google for "Access denied for user" "Using password" ? Figure 8 shows a typical website located in this manner. Ta- ble 5 contains more sample queries using the same method. The only way of preventing our systems from publicly revealing error information is removing all bugs as soon as we can and (if possible) con- figuring applications to log any errors to files instead of displaying them for the users to see. Remember that even if you react quickly (and thus make the error pages indicated by Google out-of-date), a potential intruder will still be able to examine the ver- sion of the page cached by Google by simply clicking the link to the page copy. Fortunately, the sheer volume of Web resources means Figure 6. Statistics generated by Sysinfo Table 4. Querying for application-generated system reports Query Type of information "Generated by phpSystem" operating system type and version, hardware configura- tion, logged users, open connections, free memory and disk space, mount points "This summary was generated by wwwstat" web server statistics, system file structure "These statistics were produced by getstats" web server statistics, system file structure "This report was generated by WebLog" web server statistics, system file structure intext:"Tobias Oetiker" "traffic analysis" system performance statistics as MRTG charts, network configuration intitle:"Apache::Status" (inurl:server-status | inurl: status.html | inurl:apache.html) server version, operating system type, child process list, current connections intitle:"ASP Stats Generator *.*" "ASP Stats Generator" "2003-2004 weppos" web server activity, lots of visitor information intitle:"Multimon UPS status page" UPS device performance statistics intitle:"statistics of" "advanced web statistics" web server statistics, visitor information intitle:"System Statistics" +"System and Network Information Center" system performance statistics as MRTG charts, hard- ware configuration, running services intitle:"Usage Statistics for" "Generated by Webalizer" web server statistics, visitor information, system file structure intitle:"Web Server Statistics for ****" web server statistics, visitor information inurl:"/axs/ax-admin.pl" -script web server statistics, visitor information inurl:"/cricket/grapher.cgi" MRTG charts of network interface performance inurl:server-info "Apache Server Information" web server version and configuration, operating system type, system file structure "Output produced by SysWatch *" operating system type and version, logged users, free memory and disk space, mount points, running proc- esses, system logs www.hakin9.org 8 hakin9 4/2005 Basics that pages can only be cached for a relatively short time. Prowling for Passwords Web pages contain a great many passwords to all manner of resourc- es ? e-mail accounts, FTP servers or even shell accounts. This is mostly due to the ignorance of users who unwittingly store their passwords in publicly accessible locations, but also due to the carelessness of software manufacturers who either provide insufficient measures of protecting user data or supply no information about the necessity of modifying their products' standard configuration. Take the example of WS_FTP, a well-known and widely-used FTP client which (like many utilities) of- fers the option of storing account passwords. WS_FTP stores its configuration and user account information in the WS_FTP.ini file. Unfortunately, not everyone real- ises that gaining access to an FTP client's configuration is synonymous with gaining access to a user's FTP resources. Passwords stored in the WS_FTP.ini file are encrypted, but this provides little protection ? once an intruder obtains the configuration Figure 7. Querying for Informix database errors Figure 8. MySQL database error Table 5. Error message queries Query Result "A syntax error has occurred" filetype:ihtml Informix database errors, potentially containing function names, filenames, file structure information, pieces of SQL code and passwords "Access denied for user" "Using password" authorisation errors, potentially containing user names, function names, file structure information and pieces of SQL code "The script whose uid is " "is not allowed to access" access-related PHP errors, potentially containing filenames, function names and file structure information "ORA-00921: unexpected end of SQL command" Oracle database errors, potentially containing filenames, function names and file structure information "error found handling the request" cocoon filetype:xml Cocoon errors, potentially containing Cocoon version information, filenames, function names and file structure information "Invision Power Board Database Error" Invision Power Board bulletin board errors, potentially containing function names, filenames, file structure information and piece of SQL code "Warning: mysql _ query()" "invalid query" MySQL database errors, potentially containing user names, function names, filenames and file structure information "Error Message : Error loading required libraries." CGI script errors, potentially containing information about operating system and program versions, user names, filenames and file structure information "#mysql dump" filetype:sql MySQL database errors, potentially containing information about database structure and contents www.hakin9.org 9 hakin9 4/2005 Google hacking file, he can either decipher the pass- word using suitable tools or simply install WS_FTP and run it with the stolen configuration. And how can the intruder obtain thousands of WS_FTP configuration files? Using Google, of course. Simply querying for "Index of/" "Parent Directory" "WS _ FTP.ini" or filetype:ini WS _ FTP PWD will return lots of links to the data he requires, placed at his evil dispos- al by the users themselves in their blissful ignorance (see Figure 9). Another example is a Web ap- plication called DUclassified, used for managing website advertising materials. In its standard configura- tion, the application stores all the user names, passwords and other data in the duclassified.mdb file, located in the read-accessible _private subdirectory. It is therefore enough to find a site that uses DU- classified, take the base URL http:// <host>/duClassified/ and change it to http://<host>/duClassified/ _private/duclassified.mdb to ob- tain the password file and thus obtain unlimited access to the ap- plication (as seen in Figure 10). Websites which use the vulner- able application can be located by querying Google for "Powered by DUclassified" -site:duware.com (the additional operator will filter out results from the manufacturer's website). Interestingly enough, the makers of DUclassified ? a com- pany called DUware ? have also created several other applications with similar vulnerabilities. In theory, everyone knows that passwords should not reside on post-its stuck to the monitor or under the keyboard. In practice, however, surprisingly many people store passwords in text files and put them in their home directories, which (funnily enough) are acces- sible through the Internet. What's more, many such individuals work as network administrators or simi- lar, so the files can get pretty big. It's hard to define a single method of locating such data, but googling for such keywords as account, us- ers, admin, administrators, passwd, password and so on can be pretty effective, especially coupled with such filetypes as .xls, .txt, .doc, .mdb and .pdf. It's also worth noting directories whose names contain the words admin, backup and so forth ? a query like inurl:admin intitle:index.of will do the trick. Figure 9. WS_FTP configuration file Figure 10. DUclassified in its standard configuration www.hakin9.org 10 hakin9 4/2005 Basics Table 6 presents some sample queries for password-related data. To make our passwords less accessible to intruders, we must carefully consider where and why we enter them, how they are stored and what happens to them. If we're in charge of a website, we should ana- lyse the configuration of the applica- tions we use, locate poorly protected or particularly sensitive data and take appropriate steps to secure it. Personal Information and Confidential Documents Both in European countries and the U.S., legal regulations are in place to protect our privacy. Unfortunately, it is frequently the case that all sorts of confidential documents contain- ing our personal information are placed in publicly accessible loca- tions or transmitted over the Web without proper protection. To get our complete information, an intruder need only gain access to an e-mail repository containing the CV we sent out while looking for work. Ad- Table 6. Google queries for locating passwords Query Result "http://*:*@www" site passwords for site, stored as the string "http://username: password@www..." filetype:bak inurl:"htaccess|passwd|shadow|ht users" file backups, potentially containing user names and passwords filetype:mdb inurl:"account|users|admin|admin istrators|passwd|password" mdb files, potentially containing password information intitle:"Index of" pwd.db pwd.db files, potentially containing user names and encrypted passwords inurl:admin inurl:backup intitle:index.of directories whose names contain the words admin and backup "Index of/" "Parent Directory" "WS _ FTP.ini" filetype:ini WS _ FTP PWD WS_FTP configuration files, potentially containing FTP server access passwords ext:pwd inurl:(service|authors|administrators |users) "# -FrontPage-" files containing Microsoft FrontPage passwords filetype:sql ("passwd values ****" | "password values ****" | "pass values ****" ) files containing SQL code and passwords inserted into a database intitle:index.of trillian.ini configuration files for the Trillian IM eggdrop filetype:user user configuration files for the Eggdrop ircbot filetype:conf slapd.conf configuration files for OpenLDAP inurl:"wvdial.conf" intext:"password" configuration files for WV Dial ext:ini eudora.ini configuration files for the Eudora mail client filetype:mdb inurl:users.mdb Microsoft Access files, potentially containing user account infor- mation intext:"powered by Web Wiz Journal" websites using Web Wiz Journal, which in its standard con- figuration allows access to the passwords file ? just enter http: //<host>/journal/journal.mdb instead of the default http://<host>/ journal/ "Powered by DUclassified" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUcalendar" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUdirectory" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUclassmate" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUdownload" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUpaypal" -site:duware.com "Powered by DUforum" -site:duware.com intitle:dupics inurl:(add.asp | default.asp | view.asp | voting.asp) -site:duware.com websites using the DUclassified, DUcalendar, DUdirectory, DU- classmate, DUdownload, DUpaypal, DUforum or DUpics applica- tions, which by default make it possible to obtain the passwords file ? for DUclassified, just enter http://<host>/duClassified/ _ private/duclassified.mdb instead of http://<host>/duClassified/ intext:"BiTBOARD v2.0" "BiTSHiFTERS Bulletin Board" websites using the Bitboard2 bulletin board application, which on default settings allows the passwords file to be obtained ? enter http://<host>/forum/admin/data _ passwd.dat instead of the default http://<host>/forum/forum.php www.hakin9.org 11 hakin9 4/2005 Google hacking dress, phone number, date of birth, education, skills, work experience ? it's all there. Thousands of such documents can be found on the Internet ? just query Google for intitle: "curriculum vitae" "phone * * *" "address *" "e-mail" . Finding contact information in the form of names, phone number and e- mail addresses is equally easy (Figure 11). This is because most Internet users create electronic ad- dress books of some description. While these may be of little interest to your typical intruder, they can be dangerous tools in the hands of a skilled sociotechnician, especially if the contacts are restricted to one company. A simple query such as filetype:xls inurl:"email.xls" can be surprisingly effective, finding Excel spreadsheet called email.xls. All the above also applies to instant messaging applications and their contact lists ? if an intruder obtains such a list, he may be able to pose as our IM friends. Interestingly enough, a fair amount of personal data can also be obtained from of- ficial documents, such as police reports, legal documents or even medical history cards. The Web also contains docu- ments that have been marked as confidential and therefore contain sensitive information. These may include project plans, technical doc- umentation, surveys, reports, pres- entations and a whole host of other company-internal materials. They are easily located as they frequently contain the word confidential, the phrase Not for distribution or simi- lar clauses (see Figure 12). Table 7 presents several sample queries that reveal documents potentially containing personal information and confidential data. As with passwords, all we can do to avoid revealing private infor- mation is to be cautious and retain maximum control over published data. Companies and organisations should (and many are obliged to) specify and enforce rules, proce- dures and standard practices for Figure 11. Electronic address book obtained through Google Figure 12. Confidential document found through Google Figure 13. An HP printer's configuration page found by Google www.hakin9.org 12 hakin9 4/2005 Basics handling documents within the organisation, complete with clearly defined responsibilities and penal- ties for infringements. Network Devices Many administrator downplay the importance of securing such devices as network printers or webcams. However, an insecure printer can provide an intruder with a foothold that can later be used as a basis for attacking other systems in the same network or even other networks. Webcams are, of course, much less dangerous, so hacking them can only be seen as entertain- ment, although it's not hard to im- agine situations where data from a webcam could be useful (industrial espionage, robberies etc.). Table 8 contains sample queries revealing printers and webcams, while Fig- ure 12 shows a printer configuration page found on the Web. n Table 8. Queries for locating network devices Query Device "Copyright (c) Tektronix, Inc." "printer status" PhaserLink printers inurl:"printer/main.html" intext:"settings" Brother HL printers intitle:"Dell Laser Printer" ews Dell printers with EWS technology intext:centreware inurl:status Xerox Phaser 4500/6250/8200/8400 printers inurl:hp/device/this.LCDispatcher HP printers intitle:liveapplet inurl:LvAppl Canon Webview webcams intitle:"EvoCam" inurl:"webcam.html" Evocam webcams inurl:"ViewerFrame?Mode=" Panasonic Network Camera webcams (intext:"MOBOTIX M1" | intext:"MOBOTIX M10") intext:"Open Menu" Shift-Reload Mobotix webcams inurl:indexFrame.shtml Axis Axis webcams SNC-RZ30 HOME Sony SNC-RZ30 webcams intitle:"my webcamXP server!" inurl:":8080" webcams accessible via WebcamXP Server allintitle:Brains, Corp. camera webcams accessible via mmEye intitle:"active webcam page" USB webcams Table 7. Searching for personal data and confidential documents Query Result filetype:xls inurl:"email.xls" email.xls files, potentially containing contact information "phone * * *" "address *" "e-mail" intitle: "curriculum vitae" CVs "not for distribution" confidential documents containing the confidential clause buddylist.blt AIM contacts list intitle:index.of mystuff.xml Trillian IM contacts list filetype:ctt "msn" MSN contacts list filetype:QDF QDF database files for the Quicken financial application intitle:index.of finances.xls finances.xls files, potentially containing information on bank ac- counts, financial summaries and credit card numbers intitle:"Index Of" -inurl:maillog maillog size maillog files, potentially containing e-mail "Network Vulnerability Assessment Report" "Host Vulnerability Summary Report" filetype:pdf "Assessment Report" "This file was generated by Nessus" reports for network security scans, penetration tests etc. On the Net ? http://johnny.ihackstuff.com ? largest repository of data on Google hacking, ? http://insecure.org/nmap/ ? Nmap network scanner, ? http://thc.org/thc-amap/ ? amap network scanner.